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Advocacy Networks and Romani Politics in Central and Eastern Europe 
PETER VERMEERSCH 
Institute for International and European Policy, University of Leuven, Belgium 
 
This article explores the impact of the activity of international solidarity and human rights 
organizations on the political involvement of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. It will 
conclude that the increase of an international advocacy network focussing on the plight of the 
Roma has offered new opportunities to domestic Romani organizations for pressuring governments 
to change state behaviour or to introduce new policy. In some cases, governments have even 
appointed Romani personalities from well-known advocacy organizations to advisory positions. 
However, the influence of a growing advocacy network has not been able yet to create a better 
democratically elected representation of the Roma in the central arenas of political decision-
making on domestic level. Moreover, within domestic Romani movements there is growing 
discussion about the legitimacy and accountability of Romani advisors. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Transnational advocacy networks have in recent years attracted the attention of scholars 
discussing the diffusion and power of international norms (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). One of the arguments proposed in this literature 
contends that through emphasizing the norms of universal human rights, international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are able to support domestic opposition movements 
demanding political change in norm-violating states. For example, Risse and Sikkink (1999: 
5) argue that international NGOs advocating human rights have played a crucial role in 
mobilizing domestic opposition and legitimating the claims of local social movements in such 
diverse regions as Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a growing transnational advocacy network 
focusing on the situation of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Many 
international NGOs started to criticize the maltreatment of minority citizens in these countries 
and conducted campaigns aimed at changing government behaviour, educating citizens and 
raising awareness of rights within minority communities.1 In the context of the above 
literature, one wonders what this advocacy has meant for the ethnic minorities themselves 
and, in particular, for minority members aspiring to represent their communities in domestic 
politics. In other words, in what way has the increasing activity of international NGOs 
                                                        
1 Some important examples are Human Rights Watch, Minority Rights Group, Project on Ethnic Relations and 
the Soros Foundations Network. 
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working in the sphere of human rights and minority community development influenced the 
political aspirations of minorities?  
 
This article explores this question for the case of the Romani communities in Central and 
Eastern Europe. ‘Roma’ is the name increasingly used by politicians, activists and academics 
to refer to a wide variety of communities predominantly occurring in Central and Eastern 
Europe that have adopted different group and sub-group names over time (Guy 2001: xiv).2 
Although these communities have been very diverse, they share the fact that throughout 
history a similar negative meaning has generally been assigned to their identities. The 
introduction of the term ‘Roma’ reflects an attempt to break away from this social stigma and 
to produce a more positive image of themselves as a single ethnic group occurring in different 
countries. Since the breakdown of communism, and even more since the beginning of the 
process of European Union enlargement to the East, well-known human rights NGOs have 
devoted special attention to the position of the Roma and to the failure of states to protect 
them from discrimination and socio-economic marginalization. At the same time, Romani 
activists from within communities have established political organizations, and have 
attempted to represent the Roma in domestic and international political relations.3 
 
The question then is: Has the activity of international solidarity and human rights 
organizations been perceived as a clear point of support by those Roma who want to represent 
their communities in domestic politics? To explore the issues surrounding this question, this 
article starts with a discussion of Romani political participation in the narrow sense – meaning 
their participation in domestic party politics and their representation in national legislatures – 
in a selection of countries in Central and Eastern Europe.4 I will reflect on the possible 
reasons of why gaining access to politics through participation in parliamentary elections has 
by no means been easy for the Roma. In the second part of the article, I will reflect on the 
                                                        
2 The total number of Roma in Europe is estimated to be somewhere between 6 and 8 million. Official figures 
per country, mostly based on self-identification in censuses, are much lower and amount to a total of approx. 2.5 
million. An overview of both estimates and official census figures can be found on 
http://errc.org/publications/factsheets/numbers.shtml 
3 One of the recent major developments in this direction was the Fifth World Romani Congress in July 2000 in 
Prague, where the International Romani Union (IRU) – the organization that claims to form the representation of 
all the Roma in the world – reframed the status of the Roma from a minority to ‘a full nation without a territory’ 
(Acton and Klímová 2001). 
4 Although it is not the aim of this article to present an exhaustive survey of Romani political participation, I 
have chosen to include reference to a large number of countries in post-communist Central Europe for reasons of 
providing the reader with a more or less general overview of elected Romani representation in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
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political mobilization of the Roma in the broader sense, meaning the influence exerted on 
governments and legislative bodies by non-elected actors, such as Romani protest 
organizations or non-Romani solidarity and advocacy organizations. In comparison to their 
political participation in the narrow sense, Romani political activism in the broad sense seems 
to have been more successful. 
 
This article will argue that the growth of a transnational advocacy network around the 
situation of the Roma has offered the Roma unprecedented opportunities for political 
mobilization. But the success of international advocacy has, at the same time, also created 
new divisions within domestic Romani movements. Most importantly, discussions have arisen 
among Romani activists about who is entitled to represent the Roma in policy debates. An 
increasing number of individuals from advocacy organizations (both Roma and non-Roma) 
have been selected to governmental positions and have become important actors in policy 
preparation. Aspiring Romani politicians have sometimes argued that these appointed 
positions do not fulfil the role of authentic Romani representatives because they are not 
accountable to a Romani constituency, but depend on the government. I will detail the 
discussion about representation and accountability within the Romani movement at the end of 
this article by focusing briefly on recent developments in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 
 
II. Romani participation in electoral politics 
 
Roma in mainstream political parties 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, several Romani candidates in various countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe have contested parliamentary elections for main political parties. In some 
instances Romani candidates were able to enter the central arenas of political power through 
participating in or forging alliances with such a political party. This seems to have been 
possible especially in the beginning of the 1990s, in those cases where the formation of 
political parties was primarily based on the division between Communists and anti-
Communists. The number one example is Czechoslovakia, where in the 1990 elections a total 
of eleven MPs who identified themselves as Roma were elected to the various parliamentary 
assemblies of the country as candidates for the large dissident movements Public Against 
Violence (VPN) and Civic Forum (OF). Later, mainstream parties included only a very 
limited number of Roma in their candidate lists. In the 1998 elections in the Czech Republic, 
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one MP who identifies herself as Romani was elected for the Freedom Union (US). In 
Hungary, the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) brought two Romani candidates into 
the Hungarian National Assembly in 1990 and one in 1994. One Romani MP was member of 
the parliamentary fraction of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) between 1990 and 1994. 
In Bulgaria, the elections of 1994, 1997 and 1998 brought each time one Romani MP into 
parliament on a mainstream party ticket. In the most recent Bulgarian elections in June 2001, 
a Romani candidate from the list of the winning National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) and 
one from the Coalition For Bulgaria, an electoral coalition led by the Socialist Party, were 
elected. In the last Romanian parliamentary elections (November 2000) the Party of Social 
Democracy in Romania (PDSR) brought one candidate who identifies himself as Romani into 
parliament.  
 
As this list suggests, the total number of Roma elected to national legislatures on mainstream 
party tickets has remained very low throughout most of the decade and in some cases there 
has even been a visible negative trend. Also the proportion of Roma in winnable positions on 
mainstream party lists has remained low. This is somewhat striking in light of the current 
electoral competition in the region. In some countries, a party could secure or tilt current 
power balances simply by attracting large parts of the Romani voters. Nonetheless, 
mainstream parties in general have not deeply engaged in such attempts. They have usually 
argued that good Romani politicians are few and far between and that putting Romani 
politicians on the list does not necessarily mean that Roma will effectively vote for them.5 A 
number of aspiring Romani politicians have admitted that there is no strong indication that 
Roma will automatically vote for Romani candidates, independent of the ideological position 
of the list on which they stand. But they contend that a Romani political elite is clearly 
emerging (see e.g. remarks in PER 2001b). It is not unlikely that through active investment in 
the development of this elite, mainstream political parties could mobilize more Romani 
voters. Specific initiatives could be taken, such as organizing discussion workshops to foster 
debate between Romani and non-Romani politicians, or holding information sessions to 
encourage Roma to stand and participate in elections.  
 
                                                        
5 A number of NGOs in various countries have observed that Roma vote for a variety of parties. In some cases 
Romani voters are attracted to parties that have a clear anti-minority stance. For example, during the Romanian 
parliamentary elections of November 2000 the organization Romani Criss observed that a surprisingly high 
number of Roma voted for the nationalist Great Romania Party (RM). (Necula 2000) 
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According to many other Roma, the biggest problem hindering Romani presence in 
mainstream political parties lies in the fact that non-Romani voters have a negative attitude 
towards Roma on candidate lists (see e.g. remarks made by Slovak Romani activists in PER 
1999: 12). Moreover, they criticize mainstream politicians for generally not having attempted 
to change that attitude. It is no doubt true that many political parties in the region have 
avoided supporting the Roma for fear of losing votes and that they in some cases have used 
anti-Romani rhetoric to buttress populist electoral campaigns. Having observed this, a number 
of Romani activists have decided not to engage in mainstream parties anymore. They have 
believed it to be more fruitful to build Romani political representation through establishing 
specific Romani political parties that aim to attract and represent an ethnic constituency.6 
Especially in countries where other political parties have been successful in mobilizing ethnic 
constituencies – as for example in Slovakia, Romania, Macedonia and Bulgaria – Romani 
activists have indeed experimented with establishing their own ethnic parties. 
 
Romani political parties 
However, ethnic Romani parties have very rarely been viable in electoral terms. For example, 
the political party Romani Civic Initiative (ROI) in the Czech Republic has participated on its 
own in national elections, without the close affiliation it had with the Civic Forum in the 1990 
Czechoslovak elections, but has never come even close to passing the parliamentary threshold 
of 5 per cent. Recent attempts in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia point in the same direction. 
In the November 2000 elections in Romania, only two Romani parties stood for election. 
Their most successful candidate, a member of the Romani Party (Partida Romilor), reached 
only 0.66 per cent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies. Given the 5 per cent threshold, 
this was far from enough to send a representative to parliament. Nevertheless the Romani 
Party was able to fill the reserved minority seat. As part of an electoral protocol another 
member of the Romani Party was put on the PDSR list and indeed elected to parliament (PER 
2000). This means that together with the Romani candidate who has been elected from the 
PDSR list the current Romanian parliament contains two deputies who identify themselves as 
Romani representatives. The Bulgarian electoral system does not allow the formation of 
                                                        
6 For example, during an international conference on Romani political participation organized by the OSCE and 
the Czech Foreign Ministry in Prague in December 2000, the president of the International Romani Union (IRU) 
Emil Šcuka urged fellow activists not to engage in politics of the left or the right. In his view the basis for 
Romani political participation was “to forget ideological differences: no Liberalism or Christian-Democracy, but 
Romipen.” He continued to state that “many Roma say that this is wrong, that this is nationalism. But all we want 
to do is protect the Roma.” (own observation) 
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political parties on the basis of ethnicity,7 but in the elections of June 2001, the Romani 
organization EuroRoma formed an electoral coalition with the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (DPS), which traditionally has attracted mostly voters from the Turkish minority. 
This coalition party managed to gain twenty-one seats, but no Romani candidates were 
elected. A coalition called the National Union Tsar Kiro, which was known to be an electoral 
coalition of Romani organizations, also failed to attract a high number of voters and 
foundered at 0.6 per cent of the vote. The only relatively exceptional case seems to be 
Macedonia, where two Romani MPs secured seats in parliament in 1990 on the list of a party 
called Party for Total Emancipation of Roma in Macedonia (PTER).  In the current 
Macedonian parliament there is one MP for a party called the Alliance of Roma in Macedonia 
(SRM). In Slovakia, a number of parties, including ROI, have recently attempted to unite 
Romani politicians in an electoral platform in order to form a united front in the next 
parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2002. Although this has no doubt been a useful 
exercise fostering communication among Romani activists, it remains to be seen whether this 
platform will survive until the elections. Already one Slovak Romani party called the Slovak 
Romani Initiative (RIS) was not willing to participate. Instead, RIS signed a cooperation 
agreement with current populist opposition party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS) of former premier Vladimír Meciar, not exactly a party that is known for its pro-
minority stance, but nevertheless is perceived by RIS as a safer bet in electoral terms.8  
 
In general, Romani parties based solely on ethnic affiliation in all of these countries have 
done very poorly in elections, though there have been a few exceptions on the municipal 
level. The success of political parties of ethnic minorities is in general dependent on a number 
of structural or substantive factors. One factor that may have played a role in this case is the 
structural composition of the potential electorate of these parties. For example, the fact that 
Romani communities have a younger age structure means that a smaller share of their 
population is of voting age. But apart from such structural reasons, there may have also been 
more substantive causes for their low voter support. One such reason could be that those few 
Romani party representatives who had been elected in the past, have not been able to 
                                                        
7 Based on the idea that ethnic cleavage, if politicized, could form a threat to state sovereignty, Article 11 of the 
Bulgarian Constitution bans parties based on ethnic or religious membership. However, ethnicity continues to 
play a certain role in party development. For example, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party 
represents a constituency of mostly Turkish Bulgarians (see e.g. Karasimeonov 1998: 348) 
8 In the 1998 elections HZDS had two Romani candidates on its list coming from ROI. However, the Romani 
candidate with the best place on the list died only weeks before the elections and was not replaced. The other 
Romani candidate was not elected. 
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introduce tangible change within local Romani communities and have therefore not been able 
to gain the trust of Romani voters. Another reason might have been the intrinsic difficulty of 
establishing a party programme that represents the widely diverse demands and concerns of 
the Romani minority as a whole. Or it could have been the difficulty of communicating such 
programmes to potential voters who live dispersed throughout the country in sometimes 
isolated communities with no access to media. It may also have been the case that Romani 
communities have feared that casting votes for ethnic parties would further marginalize them 
or would keep their communities outside central politics. 
 
Factors related to the electoral system may also have played a role. For example, electoral 
thresholds in the Slovak and Czech Republics have prevented smaller parties from entering 
the legislature in order to prevent fragmentation. This has made it more difficult for parties 
that want to attract voters on the principle of minority membership. For Romani parties in the 
Czech Republic, for example, the electoral threshold is somewhat higher than the proportion 
of Roma among the total number of citizens. As a result, it is not very likely that Roma will 
get into parliament through an ethnic political party.9 Not surprisingly, in recent national 
elections in the Czech Republic, there have been no serious attempts to form Romani electoral 
coalitions. Romania equally maintains a 5 per cent parliamentary threshold, but has 
introduced special provisions regarding the election of deputies representing minority 
organizations. As a result, ethnic minority parties there that fail to pass the threshold can make 
use of a reserved seat in parliament. In Hungary, parties equally have to meet a 5 per cent 
threshold, but a system of secured seats in parliament has not yet been introduced although it 
is constitutionally required.10 However, an elaborate system of minority self-governments 
there has created a special form of minority representation for issues related to the collective 
rights that national and ethnic minorities enjoy in Hungary, more specifically rights in the 
field of education, media, and culture, and the collective use of minority languages.11 
 
                                                        
9 The Romani population in the Czech Republic is estimated to be at the most approx. 3 per cent of the total 
population. Official figures for Romani presence in the Czech Republic are well below 1 per cent of the 
population. 
10 See Article 68, par. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary and Article 20, par. 1 of the Act LXXVII 
of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. 
11 A critical reflection on the self-government system in Hungary can be found in Cahn (2001) 
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Evaluating Romani representation in politics  
How can we judge the current political representation of Roma in national parliaments in 
Central and Eastern Europe? With regard to ‘descriptive representation’ – meaning the 
representation of the demographic characteristics of the electorate – the composition of these 
parliaments is clearly problematic since they largely exclude the Roma as a demographic 
group. One has thus to ask whether Roma have some degree of ‘substantive representation’ – 
the representation of the policy interests of that part of the electorate, independent of the 
presence of their members in the legislature. As described above, there are indications that 
there are serious defects in the latter form of representation too. First of all, the presence of 
Romani candidates on lists of mainstream political parties has been low. Political parties 
usually avoid policy proposals that engage in a full response to the problems that face the 
Roma. Moreover, politicians have sometimes pandered to voters’ hostility towards Roma in 
order to get elected. Many Romani activists have felt that their demands were not taken 
seriously by non-ethnic political parties, even if these had strongly supported minority rights 
in their programme declarations. Romani candidates who have occasionally appeared on 
mainstream party lists have often felt that they were not in a strong enough position to 
enhance the scope of Romani representation through that party. Instances of mainstream 
parties supporting Romani candidates have often been considered by Roma as evidence of 
shrewd political calculation rather than as a dedication to tolerance and acceptance or real 
initiatives toward policy building.12 
 
One could argue that in order to enhance the substantive representation of the Roma, they will 
need a better descriptive representation in parliament. There are some mechanisms that could 
lead to such a better descriptive representation. For example, lowering the parliamentary 
threshold is a way of facilitating the presence of minority members in parliament. A system of 
reserved seats, however, provides a more effective mechanism to guarantee a minimal 
presence of the Roma in parliament. Although minimal presence will not be sufficient to 
guarantee a better substantive representation of Romani interests, there are some reasons for 
                                                        
12 An example of a discussion among Romani activists surrounding these topics can be found in the publications 
of Project on Ethnic Relations (PER), in particular in PER (1999) and PER (2001b). For example, during a 
roundtable about ‘Political Participation and the Roma’ organized by PER in Košice in March 1998, one 
participant “questioned the strategy of forming partnerships with majority parties; he suspected that these parties 
were only using the Roma to gain votes.” Another Romani participant from the Czech Republic “urged that 
Slovak Romani parties not ‘sell themselves short’ when negotiating with the majority parties. He stated that 
“[t]he Slovak Romani parties should try to find strategic partners from among the majority parties, but it was not 
so important whether these partners were on the left or the right; what was important was that they learn to work 
together and build trust.” (PER 1999: 8) 
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considering it an important precondition. It can symbolize the idea that Roma should be 
considered an essential part of the national electorate and that as such they need 
representation in the national parliament. Moreover, the presence of Roma can at least trigger 
debate on public policy from the perspective of the members of this community. It could also 
help to facilitate a process of political emancipation. For example, the elected Roma would 
have the guarantee of being able to gain experience in parliamentary representation and would 
almost certainly enhance the profile of the ethnic party they are representing. At present, such 
a system of guaranteed seats for the Roma exists in Romania and is being debated in Hungary 
(see e.g. PER 2001a). 
 
However, to date the overall development of Romani representation in electoral politics and 
national legislatures in Central and Eastern Europe has been one of very little progress. 
Although in some countries the Roma form a large enough part of the population in order to 
be a deciding factor in parliamentary elections, as good as no mainstream parties have really 
attempted to use this factor. Governments, however, increasingly realize that a better political 
participation of their Romani minorities will very likely result in a much more positive 
international evaluation of their minority policy. As the attention of the international 
community for minority questions in Central and Eastern Europe has been growing, the 
exclusion or inclusion of minorities in domestic politics has become an important factor in the 
international reputation of a country. In the context of the challenge of European integration 
which these countries now face, international organizations have more than once emphasized 
that there is a need to increase the presence of Roma in politics (See e.g. van der Stoel 2000: 
130). This is arguably one of the reasons why the non-electoral political action of the Roma 
has gained significance. 
 
III. Romani political mobilization and advocacy networks 
 
New opportunities 
There is of course more to politics than just elections, and elected representatives are not the 
only ones to defend the interests of a certain population. Today, the formation and monitoring 
of public policy is markedly influenced also by non-elected actors. In the case of the Roma, 
these actors have mostly been domestic or international NGOs working in the field of human 
rights, but also Romani self-help organizations and expert networks. This collection of actors 
could be seen as an example of an advocacy network. In the words of Keck and Sikkink 
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(1998: 8-9) an advocacy network is a network “organized to promote causes, principled ideas, 
and norms” which often involves “individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily 
linked to a rationalist understanding of their ‘interests’” (advocates plead the causes of 
others). The question then is: What influence have advocacy networks had on the process of 
Romani political mobilization in the broad sense in Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
Let us first have a look at advocacy actors in general and their role in political mobilization. 
On the one hand, advocacy actors are generally independent organizations or individuals and 
do not engage in the support of any political group in any country. On the other hand, they are 
to some extent political because they defend norms that are seen as valid across state borders, 
and that activity often includes scrutinizing those governments that do not comply with those 
norms. Research on international NGOs in the human rights sector shows that these 
organizations generally have played a crucial role in transforming state sovereignty (Risse and 
Sikkink 1999). First of all, they have contributed a great deal to the establishment of human 
rights standards in international law. Secondly, in many cases they have supported domestic 
civil society in protesting a state’s violations of international norms. Through their activities 
they have demonstrated that the power of political leaders is limited. Their involvement may 
lead governments to change policy, or in certain cases it may trigger the transformation of a 
whole political regime. 
 
During the last decade of the twentieth century a number of international human rights NGOs 
started to research and document the human rights situation of the Roma in Europe. 
Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, they found that Roma were disproportionately 
affected by the economic and political changes after 1989 and had become the number one 
victim of discrimination. However, protecting them from discrimination or changing their 
situation were not among the political priorities of the new political leaders who were 
ostensibly preoccupied with other aspects of transition politics. As of the beginning of the 
1990s, international human rights NGOs started to criticize those governments that ignored 
the conditions of many Roma’s daily lives. For example, in this period Human Rights Watch 
published a series of reports on the situation of the Roma in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and 
the Czechoslovakia, concentrating on a wide range of issues from education to unequal access 
to public and private services (Helsinki Watch 1991a, 1991b; Human Rights Watch 1992, 
1993).  
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The effects of this international attention on the position of Romani activists in Central and 
Eastern Europe seems to have been immense. First, the advocacy network around Romani 
issues made governments and society more aware of the normative context of minority 
treatment. It triggered governments to deal with the demands of minorities and think about 
new legislation. The latter half of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe has also witnessed 
a clear increase in special government programmes targeted at Romani communities. 
Although changes have not always been tangible on the local level, a growing number of 
declarations and plans have been produced by the central authorities aimed at demonstrating 
the willingness of governments to alter the situation of the Roma in relation to education, 
health and welfare or unemployment. The content of these government programmes addresses 
issues raised by human rights organizations. In certain cases international advocacy 
organizations have directly influenced the wording of new proposals in legislation and policy. 
For example, in August 2000 the Romanian government adopted an Antidiscrimination 
Ordinance, which was clearly influenced by demands of international human rights 
organizations (Zoon 2001: 21-22). Another example of this is a policy document adopted by 
the Bulgarian government in 1999 entitled ‘Framework Programme for Equal Integration of 
Roma in Bulgarian Society’. The principles of this document had been drafted by a Bulgarian 
NGO (Human Rights Project) and had been discussed and signed by a broad coalition of 
Romani organizations (Russinov 2001). As is apparent from this last example, international 
human rights organizations have also provided domestic ethnically-based Romani NGOs with 
the powerful tool of the language of international human rights to make their claims towards 
the government and to attract support from ordinary Romani citizens.  
 
Furthermore, the increased attention for Roma went hand in hand with a flow of financial and 
technical resources to the new democracies through private foundations and international 
organizations (see for example the European Union’s Phare programme). New funds became 
available to organizations that explicitly aimed to defend the rights of Romani minorities and 
support the establishment of new Romani civic organizations. The Soros foundations network, 
for instance, has been a most prominent defender of such a strategy and made financial 
support available to a large number of projects and initiatives.13 Projects sponsored by 
international donors were partly aimed at stimulating a change in the society at large through 
human rights reporting, providing legal assistance to Romani citizens or influence mass media 
                                                        
13 For example, in 1999 the Soros foundations network spent a total of approximately $7 million on Romani 
programs. See http://www.soros.org/netprog.html 
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reporting. Influential organizations in these fields have been the Budapest-based European 
Roma Rights Center and Roma Press Center. Other projects have been directed towards the 
development of Romani communities themselves, see for example the Roma Participation 
Program of the Open Society Institute (OSI), which organizes training for Romani activists.  
 
The advocacy network has also wanted to stand for values of democracy. Several 
international NGOs have tried to provide a source of education in the field of democracy and 
political organization towards a Romani audience, or they have offered the wider audience a 
new perspective on the social situation of the Roma through emphasizing universal norms of 
equity. Advocacy actors have also criticized discriminatory language and thus helped to 
produce a more positive image of Romani activists and politicians.14 Moreover, as the lack of 
political representation of Roma was increasingly seen as a democratic deficit, certain NGOs 
started to take the lead in fostering a better representation. Some recent OSI programmes, for 
example, were explicitly linked to the engagement of Roma in politics.15 Another 
international NGO – Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) – has also contributed to the 
formation of a credible Romani leadership by organizing roundtable discussions to which 
both politicians in power and selected Roma representatives have been brought together. In 
Romania and Bulgaria, international and domestic NGOs played a major role in bringing 
Romani organizations into a dialogue with government. 
 
And last, one of the political consequences of the increased attention from human rights 
NGOs has been the growing awareness of international governmental organizations for the 
plight of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. International criticism expressed by NGOs 
ostensibly led to enhanced monitoring of the situation of the Roma by international 
governmental organizations. Human rights NGOs have intentionally directed communication 
towards the international community where they are often seen as more credible lobbies than 
                                                        
14 There are clearly limits to what advocacy actors can do in this respect. For example, NGOs do not have a 
direct control over public opinion. Government officials and the media play a huge role in shaping the attitude of 
the majority towards minority citizens. The emigration of Romani refugees from Central and Eastern Europe to 
European Union countries, for example, has very noticeably influenced increased attention from EU 
governments and has induced emotional debates in the countries from where they have fled. The role of 
politicians in power has been of overriding importance here. Domestic Roma activists have tried to persuade 
public opinion that Romani emigration is in fact the result of failing policies to prevent discrimination or secure 
equal social and economic opportunity. In contrast, the Central and Eastern Europe governments themselves 
have often portrayed Romani emigration as purely driven by economic calculation. Although human rights 
NGOs have tried to emphasize the human rights concerns of those fleeing the country, politicians in the domestic 
arena seem mostly to have reinforced a view of the Roma as an economic migrant. 
15 See the OSI programs ‘Public administration training program for elected Roma leaders’ and ‘Roma political 
leadership program’, both organized in Budapest.  
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local representative organizations. A recent example of such activity was the presentation in 
the European Parliament in March 2001 of the OSI study ‘On the margins’ (Zoon 2001) about 
the unequal access to social safety nets and public services in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Ostensibly, it is the result of human rights NGOs lobbying and looking for international 
media attention that now both the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have special bodies to monitor the position of the Roma in 
their respective member states. The example of the OSCE is an interesting one, as its special 
body for Romani affairs, the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues, which is a part of the 
OSCE’s Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), has 
recently also started with directly fostering Romani political participation.16 
 
The growth of an advocacy network around Romani issues has significantly triggered 
processes of domestic Romani mobilization in Central and Eastern Europe and will probably 
continue to do so. It has triggered a process of change in governments’ attitudes towards the 
problems facing the Roma, and it has indirectly fostered domestic Romani activism. It also 
appears to have revived an international Romani movement that had more or less come to a 
halt at the end of the 1980s. International associations that have attempted to ground 
themselves within Romani communities, such as the Roma National Congress (RNC), have 
made explicit use of the language of international human rights. In the second half of the 
1990s, a new impetus was also given to the International Romani Union (IRU). In this sense, 
the emergence of a network of international NGOs active in the field of human rights and 
with a focus on the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe has been a significant factor 
determining the growth of Romani political aspirations and the formation of a Romani 
political identity.  
 
The reason why advocacy actors have been able to play such an important role in politics 
most likely lies in the fact that both governments and Romani activists have taken them 
seriously. Governments have regarded advocacy actors as credible critics of the situation of 
the oppressed because such actors represent internationally valid principles, and not the 
                                                        
16 In December 2000 the OSCE and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized an international conference 
on ‘Roma and political participation’ in Prague. The stated purpose of the conference was to look for ways to 
improve the public role of Roma in society and to develop strategies to increase Roma political participation, 
drawing on the experiences of Roma leaders who have already been elected to public office. 
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private interests of only one group.17 And Romani activists have found in advocacy 
organizations useful tools for pressuring their government and mobilizing their communities. 
 
Romani mobilization and the problem of political representation 
However positive the influence of advocacy networks on the political mobilization of the 
Roma may seem at first sight, it has nonetheless confronted Romani activists with new 
questions. In particular, the problem surrounding the creation of a legitimate Romani 
representation looms large. Who has the democratic or moral mandate to speak on behalf of 
‘the Roma’ on domestic levels as well as in the international political arena? Governmental 
bodies on both the international and the domestic level have not been able to include a 
democratically elected Romani voice in the deliberative process and have often in response 
established advisory and expert bodies in which mostly a number of Roma from NGOs are 
included. The status of these advisory and expert bodies is often not clear. Sometimes they 
seem more to function as representative deliberation bodies than as advisory bodies. Since 
both states and international organizations have emphasized that Romani representation is 
needed in policy deliberation, the illusion is sometimes created that experts can play the role 
of representatives. This has created some discussion among Roma about who has the right to 
‘represent’ the Roma in these bodies. 
 
On the European level, international organizations have repeatedly emphasized that initiatives 
targeted at the situation of the Roma must be co-designed by Romani representatives in order 
to be effective. But since there are no elected representatives, the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE have set up special offices, in which a selection of Romani members from advocacy 
organizations have an advisory seat (the OSCE’s Contact point for Roma and Sinti and the 
Specialist Group on Roma/Gypsies of the Council of Europe). Romani organizations 
themselves that are active across borders have responded to this situation by trying to 
establish a firm basis for further dialogue with international institutions and the people in 
these advisory bodies. Plausibly, one of the main motivations for transforming the IRU from a 
pressure group into an organization aspiring to represent “all Roma in the world”, has been 
the increasing need for a representative Romani partner expressed by bodies in the Council of 
Europe, the EU and the OSCE. It is questionable, however, if the gap between local Romani 
communities and international institutions can be bridged by an organization like the IRU. Its 
                                                        
17 Some authors, for example Trehan (2001), have argued that just because advocacy organizations for Roma act 
from the perspective of a normative agenda, they tend to neglect the real needs of communities. 
  
16  
officers have been elected by the members of the organization itself and are in this sense not 
really representative of a European-wide Romani constituency (the boundaries of which 
would be very hard to define anyway). Moreover, the IRU in general has more than once been 
criticized for its lack of support from ordinary Roma (Acton and Klímová 2001: 162). Apart 
from the specificities of the IRU, it is in general questionable if European Romani political 
representation can be reached through including members of advocacy organizations in the 
process of policy preparation. It is no doubt important that ideas on how to improve the 
situation of the Roma are debated publicly and that Roma themselves are included in such 
debates. However, there is a problem when the inclusion of Roma in the discussion is 
portrayed as the establishment of a ‘Romani representation’ needed to ensure the 
effectiveness of the initiatives taken by these international bodies.18 Public debate on policy 
directed towards Roma is no doubt necessary, and inviting well-known Romani activists to 
participate in this debate is certainly a step in that direction. But they should certainly not be 
seen as ‘Romani representatives’ responsible for ensuring the success of the initiatives taken 
by these international institutions. Special institutions for ‘Romani representation’ as they 
have been framed on the European level, have almost inevitably created some discussion 
among Romani activists about the legitimacy of the personalities included (PER 2001b: 1). 
 
In the various national arenas, the question about legitimate representation leads to even more 
discussion among Romani activists. I will illustrate this with a brief reference to recent 
developments in Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In the strict sense, advocacy 
organizations, even if they are based on Romani membership, are not the representatives of 
the entire Romani population of a country. They have not aimed to speak for the people in the 
sense of articulating and defending the claims of one group, rather they have aimed to speak 
and act in the name of ‘an idea’ (for example, in this case, the idea that Roma should not be 
discriminated against or that funds should be made available to address situations of poverty). 
In this way, advocacy organizations (Romani as well as non-Romani) are not accountable to a 
Romani constituency in the same way a democratically elected representative would be. 
However, in the three countries under consideration, the activities of advocacy organizations 
have led to the emergence of an identifiable group of influential Roma, or a Romani ‘political 
elite’, which have become regarded as ‘representatives’. These people are often quoted in the 
                                                        
18 The description offered by the Council of Europe is telling: “one of the fundamental principles guiding the 
Council of Europe’s approach is participation of the communities concerned, through Roma/Gypsy 
representatives and associations. Without this, no lasting progress will be accomplished.” 
(http://www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/action/roma.htm) 
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media, have been able to voice their opinions about concrete problems, and are often invited 
to international conferences. In the three countries, a number of them have been approached 
by the respective government to participate in dialogue or act as experts in policy formation or 
preparation of legal changes. In Hungary, for example, such a process of consultation took 
place before the elaboration of the Minorities Act of 1993. In recent years the Slovak 
government created the position of Government Commissioner for Roma Affairs, while the 
Czech Republic has organized an Interministerial Commission for Romani Community 
Issues, which contains a number of people from the ‘Romani elite’. 
 
Such initiatives have in general been supported by Romani activists, because they regard it as 
important to have a say in policy preparation. A number of Romani activists probably have 
seen this kind of expert function as a way to influence government from a Romani perspective 
without having to deal with the problems of electoral mobilization discussed earlier in this 
article. Moreover, for many Romani activists it was important that governments wanted to 
discuss new policy proposals with at least some members of the communities in question, 
even if these were not officially elected representatives of these communities. 
 
But a by-product of this development has been a new division between officially 
acknowledged Romani advisors and Romani activists who are not officially recognized. 
Discussion about who has the right to be recognized as legitimate advisors seem to have 
surfaced in the three countries. The context of the discussion differs to a large extent between 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other hand. In the 
Czech and Slovak Republics the Romani participants in these bodies increasingly function as 
a substitute for the lack of elected Romani representation (and are probably regarded as such 
also by many ordinary Roma). Therefore, discussion in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
mostly concerns the very weak connection that some of the selected Romani activists have 
with Romani communities. The governments of the two countries have to some extent created 
the illusion that the ‘Romani elite’ forms an alternative political representation, while the 
problem of the lack of inclusion of Roma in regular political bodies has moved into the 
background. 
 
In Hungary, the problem has a somewhat different character. As a result of the Hungarian 
minority legislation, there is now a fifty-three-member elected National Gypsy Self-
Government, which has become the official ‘ethnicized’ partner of the government to discuss 
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matters related to the minority rights of the Roma. One can say that in Hungary there is a form 
of democratically elected Romani representation. However, a debate about legitimate Romani 
representation is still ongoing among Romani activists. One part of the discussion relates to 
the way in which the National Gypsy Self-Government is elected.19  Another aspect of the 
discussion is concerned with the way the government has treated this body. The National 
Gypsy Self-Government has been seen by the government as the exclusive partner for 
dialogue, thereby largely ‘illegitimatizing’ alternative Romani advocacy organizations which 
have aimed at influencing policy but are not engaged in the self-government system. Certain 
Roma have also felt that through the establishment of this self-government system the state 
has neglected to care about the overall inclusion of Roma in regular political organizations. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This article has illustrated that the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe are politically 
underrepresented in national politics. A very low number of Roma make it into the national 
legislatures and very few politicians have attempted to represent Romani interests. It is 
sometimes claimed that the Roma are not represented because they are too divided to form a 
political force. Although it is true that there is a wide diversity of opinion and interest within 
the Romani population, it is nevertheless striking that these diverse interests have also 
remained absent from the various mainstream political groupings. This can hardly be blamed 
on fragmentation within the Romani movement. 
 
In contrast, however, increasing numbers of Roma have in recent years found their way to an 
advocacy network consisting of domestic or international NGOs working in the field of 
human rights, community development or media. This has clearly offered new opportunities 
for pressuring governments to change state behaviour or to introduce new policy without 
engaging in elections or in party politics. Although these new strategies have led to a number 
of changes in policy, they have not led to a better representation of Roma in the central arenas 
of political decision-making. In some cases, states have attempted to institutionalize the 
                                                        
19 The election of the local minority self-governments is based on universal franchise and not on the ethnic 
identity of the voters. As a result, it is currently unclear who exactly has elected the local minority self-
governments. The large number of votes cast for local Gypsy self-governments, for example, raise the suspicion 
that a great group of non-Romani voters have participated in the elections. A number of Romani organizations 
have therefore claimed that these Gypsy self-governments cannot be regarded as representative of the Roma, and 
that – by extension – also the National Gypsy Self-government is not really a representative body for the Romani 
population. 
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influence coming from well-known Romani collaborators of advocacy organizations through 
the establishment of advisory bodies. But, as the examples of Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia show, this development has triggered new divisions within the Romani 
movement, revolving around the question of the legitimacy and the accountability of these 
Romani advisors. 
 
When governments today want to design policy on problems that affect Roma, they can in 
many cases not include a democratically elected Romani voice in the deliberative process. To 
solve this problem, advisory and expert bodies have been established in which a number of 
Roma from NGOs are included. In itself, this is arguably a legitimate way of policy-making. 
However, it should be made clear that these Roma are not representing a Romani constituency 
and that they cannot make up for the lack of Roma individuals in democratically elected 
bodies. This point may sound obvious, but is often overlooked by both governments and 
Roma. Governments may create the false impression that there is no longer an urgent need to 
work on the inclusion of Roma in politics, because they have Romani experts with whom they 
can deliberate policy measures. While Roma have sometimes accused Romani experts and 
advocacy actors of not serving the cause of the Roma because they have no real constituency. 
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